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1. INTRODUCTION
The Fukushima Dai-Ichi accident in 2011 continues to
affect various aspects of the nuclear society worldwide.
There are still different opinions about whether this type
of accident could have been prevented or not. However, it
is very clear that the Fukushima Dai-Ichi accident revealed
some problems in the conventional approaches used to
ensure the safety of nuclear installations including Nuclear
Power Plants (NPPs). To prevent this kind of accident in
the future, we have to learn from the Fukushima Dai-Ichi
accident. Thereafter, we also have to improve the conven-
tional approaches used to ensure nuclear safety based on
the lessons learned. Many papers and reports have already
addressed such issues [1-11]. In this paper, we will therefore
cover these issues in light of the risk concept.
First of all, we have to clearly identify the key issues
that affected the progress of the accident greatly. We try
to identify the important issues in the accident from the
Defense-in-Depth (DID) point of view to find them in a
more systematic manner. In Section 2, we will review the
details of the identified issues for each level of the DID
defined by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
[12].
Then, we have to find some ways of resolving the
identified issues. We will therefore reexamine the identified
key issues from a risk space point of view. We will also
review all possible accident scenarios types within the
risk space to clarify the characteristics of the identified
issues. In Section 3, we will use the concepts of residual
and unknown risks in classifying the risk space and the
accident scenarios [13]. Based on the risk space concept,
we will propose a more systematic approach to improve
nuclear safety. 
In Section 4, we will address some technical issues to
be improved in the current risk assessment and management
practices, especially within the Probabilistic Safety Assessment
(PSA) framework. PSA is a typical risk assessment tool
for nuclear installations. After the Fukushima Dai-Ichi
accident, however, there are arguments about the usefulness
of PSA since PSA did not predict the accident. Therefore,
we have to rethink the traditional practices of risk assessment
and management for nuclear installations. We will discuss
some technical issues to be improved in the conventional risk
assessment and management practices. The final conclusions
will be provided with Section 5. 
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We will use the following terminology in this paper:
accident prevention, accident mitigation, risk assessment,
and risk management. For NPPs, accident prevention means
the efforts to prevent the core melt in a NPP. Accident
mitigation means the efforts to confine radioactive materials
within the final barrier of a NPP, e.g. the containment of
a NPP, and to minimize the consequences of released
radioactive materials from a final barrier. Risk assessment
means the activities performed to assess the risk of a nuclear
installation. Finally, risk management means the activities
performed to improve the safety of a nuclear installation
based on the results and insights of the risk assessment.
The risk assessment and management activities will enhance
the prevention and the mitigation capabilities of a nuclear
installation for an accident. The scopes of these termi-
nologies are shown in Fig.1.
2. IDENTIFICATION OF KEY ISSUES THAT
AFFECTED THE PROGRESS OF THE
FUKUSHIMA DAI-ICHI ACCIDENT 
The direct causes of the Fukushima Dai-Ichi accident
were the 2011 Tohoku earthquake and tsunami that resulted
in a long term SBO (Station Black Out) and the loss of
an ultimate heat sink [1-11]. However, there were a lot of
issues that affected the progress of the accident. To identify
the key issues that affected the progress of the accident
greatly without missing important ones, we need a system-
atic framework to examine the accident. 
DID is a basic safety principle for a nuclear facility
[12]. DID is a systematic and effective concept that has
worked well for several decades in ensuring nuclear safety.
It is also clearly stated in a 2010 IAEA document that “in
order to determine whether DID has been adequately
implemented, the safety assessment shall determine whether
special attention has been given to internal and external
hazards that have the potential to adversely affect more
than one barrier at once or to cause simultaneous failures
of safety systems; and specific measures have been imple-
mented to ensure the effectiveness of the required levels
of defense” [14]. However, it seemed that there were some
defects in the DID features of the Fukushima Dai-Ichi
NPPs since all levels of DID failed during the Fukushima
Dai-Ichi accident. Therefore, we will use DID as a frame-
work to identify the key issues in the accident progression. 
There are still on-ongoing efforts to identify many
unsolved issues in the accident progression [15]. However,
even though we still lack much critical information needed
to identify all important issues of the accidents, we already
know some important issues that greatly affected the acci-
dent progression. In Table 1, the key issues important to
the accident progression are summarized from the DID
point of view according to levels 1-5 of DID defined by
the IAEA [12]. In Table 1, the issues are classified into two
groups: (1) technical issues and (2) human/organizational
issues. The details of each issue are explained in Table 2.
The problems revealed during the accident might be
caused by cultural or social aspects. In Table 2, we do not
cover the cultural or social issues such as the lack of safety
culture, insufficient independence of the Japanese regulatory
body, etc. Even though such issues are interrelated closely
with the technical issues, it is difficult to identify and estimate
their effect in the actual engineering field. Therefore, in
this paper, we will focus only on the technical and human/
organizational issues described in Table 2 that can be
observed explicitly from the accident.
Based on Tables 1 and 2, the Fukushima Dai-Ichi
accident can be summarized as follows. The information
regarding the accident is based on various references [1-11] 
At the first level of DID, we try to prevent abnormal
operation and failures by using conservative design
concepts and high quality equipment at the construc-
tion and operation stages. After the Tohoku earthquake,
all operating NPPs at the Fukushima Dai-Ichi site
were shut down successfully. The Emergency Diesel
Generators (EDGs) started successfully to cope
with the Loss of Off-site Power (LOOP) caused by
the earthquake. However, the height of the tsunami
caused by the earthquake was much larger the design
basis tsunami height assumed by Tokyo Electric
Power Co., Ltd. (TEPCO), and thus the barrier for
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Fig. 1. The Scope of Accident Prevention, Mitigation, Risk Assessment and Management
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the tsunami was ineffective. This was a main cause
of the multi-unit accident at the Fukushima Dai-Ichi
site. TEPCO determined the design basis for the
tsunami height based on a deterministic method
proposed by the Japan Society of Civil Engineering
(JSCE) [16, 17], even though they performed the
probabilistic tsunami hazards assessment that
resulted in a high probability of a huge tsunami [18].
Considering the large uncertainty of natural hazard
assessment, the results of such probabilistic assess-
ment should be examined carefully.
The second level of DID is the control of abnormal
operation and detection of failures by using control,
limiting, and protection systems and other surveillance
features. The large earthquake delayed the restoration
of off-site power and caused a long term SBO. It was
reported in 1990 that the SBO is the most important
contributor to risk of a Mark-I type Boiling Water
Reactor (BWR) like NPPs in the Fukushima site
[19]. TEPCO assumed that the LOOP would be
recovered soon with help from the adjacent NPPs.
However, the supports from off-site took a long
time due to the harsh environment caused by the
large earthquake and tsunami. The Fukushima Dai-
Ichi NPPs lost most of their safety systems including
Instrument and Control (I&C) systems due to the
power outage which lasted for quite a long period.
The failure of I&C systems caused serious problems
in coping with the accident appropriately. The impor-
tance of I&C systems during a severe accident has
been emphasized since the Three Mile Island accident
[20]. However, the NPPs of the Fukushima Dai-
Ichi site did not have adequate I&C systems that
could work under severe accident conditions for a
long period of time.
The third level of DID is the control of accidents
within the design basis by using engineered safety
features and accident procedures. During the accidents,
the operators failed to operate the safety systems,
such as the  Isolation Condensers (IC) at unit 1 and
the High Pressure Coolant/Core Injection System
(HPCI) at unit 3, successfully. There were also miss-
communications between the operators in the main
control room and the managers at the emergency
response center. Other active safety systems could
not be used due to the long term SBO. Also, the
multi-unit accident caused problems in the accident
mitigation for another unit. For instance, the hydrogen
explosion at unit 1 delayed the power restoration
for unit 2. 
Levels of DID 
Level 1 
Prevention of
abnormal operation
and failures 
Conservative design
and high quality in
construction and
operation
Extreme Earthquake
& Tsunami 
• Underestimated
Tsunami Hazard
• Combined Hazards 
Level 2 
Control of abnormal
operation and
detection of failures 
Control, limiting
and protection
systems and other
surveillance features
Long Term SBO 
• Delayed Power
Recovery
• Loss of I&C 
Level 3 
Control of accidents
within the design
basis
Engineered safety
features and
accident procedures 
Core Damage
Loss of SFP
Cooling
• Multi-unit
Accident
• Human Error/Miss
Communication  in
IC/HPCI Operation 
• Harsh Working
Environment
Level 4 
Control of severe
plant conditions,
including prevention
of accident
progression and
mitigation of the
consequences of
severe accidents
Complementary
measures and
accident
management
Venting & Sea
Water
Injection/Hydrogen
Explosion
• Hydro. Explosion
at Unanticipated
Locations
• Damage to SFP 
• Safety vs. Security 
• Delayed Venting 
• Emergency
PreparednessLevel  5 
Mitigation of
radiological
consequences of
significant releases
of radioactive
materials
Off-site emergency
response Evacuation
• Safety of the
Damaged NPPs
Objective Essential means Accident Progress Tech. Issues Human/Org. Issues
Table 1. The Summary of The Fukushima Dai-Ichi Accident from the DID Point of View
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Issues Explanations
Underestimated
Tsunami Hazard 
- The countermeasures against tsunami are a voluntary work of utilities. There was no regulatory provision
against the tsunami beyond the design basis. 
- It seems there was no consideration of the tsunami hazards in determining the location of EDGs.
Combined Hazards
- The earthquake damaged the infrastructure including roads and delayed the support from the off-site
- The loop caused by the tsunami was not recovered for a long period due to the damage by the earthquake
to another NPPs
Delayed Power
Recovery (Long
Term SBO)
- It assumed that LOOP can be recovered within a short time period with the help of other units and the
nearby sites. However, the same accident causes impacted the multi-unit at the site and the sites nearby at
the same time. 
- The recovery of LOOP was delayed due to the destruction of the infrastructures such as roads, and the
harsh working environment such as the debris caused by the tsunami. 
Loss of I&C
- Most I&C systems failed after the SBO
- Some instruments provided incorrect signals (unreliable information on reactor water levels)
- Incorrect signals resulted in misinterpretation of the states of the damaged cores, resulting in making
inappropriate decisions.
Multi-Unit Accident
- The hydrogen explosion at unit 1 caused the delay of power restoration at unit 2
- The hydrogen explosion at unit 4 caused by the accident in unit 3
- The onsite resources were not enough to handle the simultaneous multi-unit accident
Hydrogen Explosion
at Unanticipated
Locations
Damage to Spent
Fuel Pool
- Hydrogen explosions occurred at the unanticipated locations (i.e., top floor and the adjacent unit) and the
efforts to prevent explosions did not work well.
- The physical impact and the radioactivity release due to hydrogen explosion delayed the accident
management.
- The earthquake and hydrogen explosions damaged the integrity of SFP. The SFP of unit 3 was damaged
due to hydrogen explosion. The SFP of unit 4 is not severely damaged, however.
- Since the conditions of SFP was unknown, there were major concerns on the re-criticality and fire of
spent fuel rods with the loss of cooling in the SFP. Several cooling water sources were used for the
cooling of the SFP.
Safety vs. Security - The main gates of the NPPs were designed based on the fail-closed concept for the security. The closed
gates from the power loss prevented entering of fire trucks into the site.
Safety of the
Damaged NPPs
- There are concerns about the integrity of structure, systems and component of damaged NPPs
- The contamination of underground water becomes an important issue
Human Error/Miss
Communication in
IC/HPCI Operation
- In unit 1, operators did not notice the loss of IC. In addition, it was not report to emergency response
center after switched off the IC.
- In unit 3, the shift operators switched off HPCI before an alternative water injection was prepared
(without checking the status of the DC batteries to open SRVs). The reporting of the erroneous action
was also delayed.
Harsh Working
Environment
- The working condition was extremely harsh due to the combined hazard and the radiation
- It caused many problems in mitigating the accidents
- No dosimeters were provided with some operators
Delayed Venting
Emergency
Preparedness
- The vent valves (AOV) could not be accessed due to high dose level.
- The start of venting operation was delayed for several hours.
- Poor operation of containment vent valves
- The evacuation instructions to local government were not specific nor in detail.
- Insufficient/ineffective information sharing among major players
Table 2. The Explanation of the Issues in the Fukushima Dai-Ichi Accidents
The fourth level of DID is the control of severe
plant conditions, including prevention of accident
progression and mitigation of the consequences of
severe accidents by implementing complementary
measures and accident management. However, the
sea water injection and venting of containments were
delayed and operators failed to prevent hydrogen
explosions at several units. The hydrogen explosions
at unanticipated locations caused serious problems
in mitigating the accident in adjacent plants. The
concerns about the integrity of the spent fuel pool
(SFP) made the situation more complex, especially
at unit 4. The problem of unit 4 was caused by an
unanticipated hydrogen explosion which was caused
by the hydrogen generated at unit 3. Nobody antic-
ipated such an accident. 
The fifth level of DID is the mitigation of radiological
consequences of significant releases of radioactive
materials by doing effective off-site emergency
response. However, the response to the off-site
emergency was ineffective due to the improper
communication of critical information, the lack of
clear orders, a sudden change of the responding
organization, etc. In addition, long term safety of the
damaged NPPs becomes an important issue. There
are concerns about the integrity of the structure,
systems, and components (SSC) of damaged NPPs.
The contamination of underground water becomes
an important issue [21].
3. A FRAMEWORK FOR ENHANCING NUCELAR
SAFETY FROM THE RISK POINT OF VIEW
The safety of industrial installations is ensured by the
safety features and confirmed by the safety assessments.
In section 2, we identified the key issues from the DID
point of view. To prevent this kind of accident in the
future, we need a way of resolving the identified key
issues in the design of safety features and/or the safety
assessment aspects. Therefore we need a systematic
framework to identify the characteristics of the key
issues. In Section 3, we will reexamine the identified key
issues from the risk point of view to find the ways of
improving the current approaches used in the design of
safety features and the safety assessments. 
We will use the concepts of residual risk [13] and
unknown risk in classifying the risk space. Fig.2 shows
the risk spaces related to nuclear safety. 
All industrial installations including NPPs have inherent
risks. We try to control and reduce these risks by adding
safety features to the installations. We hope to reduce the
inherent risk completely. Unfortunately, it is impossible
to achieve zero risk in the real world even if all safety
features operate perfectly according to the design objectives.
This is due to the intrinsic limitations of safety features.
When we design safety features, we make some assump-
tions regarding the risk source of the installations e.g.,
the Design Basis Accident (DBA) of NPPs. However,
such assumptions cannot cover all risk sources. There
can be many risk sources not considered in designing the
safety features. In addition, the assumptions used to assess
nuclear safety are not valid in many cases. For instance,
the single failure criteria for the DBA are not realistic in
many cases. 
In the real world, the safety features fail to operate due
to various reasons such as design defect, degradation,
problems in manufacturing and maintenance, and human
errors, etc. Therefore, all installations shall have residual
risks that cannot be eliminated by safety features even
though we add more safety features and increase their
availability.
One more issue is called an unknown risk. There can
be some risk sources that we don’t know their existence
or how they behave. This kind of risk is due to the limitation
of current human knowledge. Actually, the residual and/
or unknown risks are related to a well-known problem
called the completeness issue in PSA [22]. It is clear that
any safety feature and/or safety assessment methods cannot
cover all risk contributors.
As illustrated in Fig.2, the risk space can be divided
into three regions. 
Controlled Risk Region: The region represents
the risk eliminated by the successful operation of
various safety features. 
Residual Risk Region: This region is the whole
risk region except the controlled risk region. The
residual risks consist of two sub-regions as follows.
- Screened Out Risk Region: This risk is generated
from the screened out risk sources such as the
screened out initiating events and some risk sources
excluded by the assumptions used in designing safety
features for a specific risk source. In some cases,
however, some of the screened out risk sources can
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Fig. 2. Risk Space of The Industrial Installations
(SS: Safe State, US: Unsafe State) 
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be covered by the existing safety features. Such
cases belong to the controlled risk region.
- Failure Risk Region: the risks due to the failure
of safety features by various reasons as mentioned
above.
Unknown Risk Region: There are risks generated
by unknown risk sources. This region overlaps with
the controlled and residual risk regions.
An installation will only be in the safe state in the
controlled risk region. However, even within some part
of the controlled risk region, the installation will not be
in the safe state due to unknown risk source. 
All safety assessment methods including the deterministic
and probabilistic safety assessments are based on the
assumed accident scenarios. Based on the risk space con-
cepts, all possible accident scenarios that can occur in a
NPP can be classified as shown in Fig.3, where the accident
scenario space is divided into the initiating events space,
failure space, and end state space. 
The initiating events space of Fig.3 is divided into
three regions: the initiating events included in the PSA
(PSA IE), the initiating events screened out based on some
criteria and/or assumptions (S/O IE), and other initiating
events that might be caused by the unknowns (UK IE).
The initiating events of the DBA and Beyond DBA (BDBA)
are assumed to be subsets of the PSA IE. The failure
space is divided into single and multiple failures spaces.
The end state space is largely divided into two regions:
the success and the accident state (unsafe state) spaces.
The accident state space can be divided into three sub-
regions according to the origin of initiating events (PSA
IE, S/O IE, and UK IE).
In Fig.3, the solid line represents the success scenarios
that end with the safe state without regard to the type of
initiating events. All dashed lines represent accident
scenarios that end with an unsafe state. The accident
scenarios can be divided into four types as shown below.
Each accident scenario type can be mapped into the
corresponding risk spaces of Fig.2 as shown in the right
side of Fig.3. 
- Type 1 Scenarios: These scenarios are the success
scenarios represented by the solid line and correspond
to the controlled risk region of the risk space.
- Type 2 Scenarios: These scenarios are the accident
scenarios caused by the PSA IE and ended with an
unsafe state. These are represented by the dashed
line and correspond to the failure risk region of the
risk space. 
- Type 3 Scenarios: the accident scenarios caused by
the S/O IE and ended with an unsafe state. These are
represented by the dotted dashed line and correspond
to the screened out risk region of the risk space.
- Type 4 Scenarios: the accident scenarios caused by
the UK IE and ended with an unsafe state. These are
represented by the double dotted dashed line and
correspond to the unknown risk region of the risk space.
The issues of Table 2 can be reclassified according to
the risk space concept as shown in Table 3. For instance,
the loss of I&C systems or delayed venting belong to the
failure risk region corresponding to a Type 2 scenario. The
underestimated tsunami hazard and multi-unit accident are
good examples of the inappropriate screened out process
Fig. 3. Accident Scenario Spaces
(BDBA: Beyond DBA, DBA: Design Basis Accident, IE: Initiating Events, PSA: Probabilistic Safety Assessment, S/O: Screen
Out, UK: Unknown)
Failure Risk Screened Out Risk Unknown Risk
• Loss of I&C
• Human Error in
IC/HPCI Operation
• Delayed Venting
• Emergency
Preparedness
• Tsunami Hazard
• Combined Hazard 
• Long Term SBO
• Multi-unit
Accidents
• Damage to SFP 
• Harsh Working
Environment
• Hydrogen
Explosion at
Unanticipated
Locations
• Safety of Damaged
NPPs
• Safety vs. Security
Table 3. Type of Key Issues from the Risk Space Point of View
corresponding to a Type 3 scenario. The hydrogen explosion
at unit 4 belongs to unknown risk region corresponding
to a Type 4 scenario, and so on.
To achieve a high level of nuclear safety, we have to
set up a systematic approach to reduce various risk sources.
Our activities to enhance nuclear safety can be classified
according to the relations with each region of the risk space.
Our goal is to extend the controlled risk region. In the
previous section, we have reviewed the accident from the
DID point of view, mainly focusing on the failures of
SSC. However, we can also get some insights from the
successful operation of safety features after the large
earthquake to increase the controlled risk region. Our
effort to reduce the risks should be based on such insights
as well.
An approach such as the Design Extension Condition
(DEC) concept proposed by the IAEA [23] will be
helpful in increasing the controlled risk region.
However, in this section, we are focusing on how to
reduce the residual and unknown risk regions. Since the
controlled risk region is complementary of the residual
risk region, the controlled risk region can be expanded by
reducing the residual and unknown risk regions. The strate-
gies to reduce the risk for each risk region are summarized
below:
Reduction of Screened Out Risks Regions: 
- To reduce the screened out risk region more system-
atically, we need to reexamine the conventional
screening out process. Traditionally, we have screened
out some accidents based on the frequency [13, 24].
However, the screen out process should not be based
on the frequency but on the risk. The accidents of
points A and B in Fig. 4 would have been screened
out if we used the conventional approach. In the
risk aspects, accidents A and B are totally different
ones. So the risk perspective must be incorporated
into the screening out process. Even though, in the
conventional approach, an event with very low
frequency such as a large loss of coolant accident
is selected as a DBA, we need a more systematic
approach for the broad scope of the screening out
process. For the cases without a quantitative risk
assessment, a qualitative risk assessment approach
such as failure mode effect analysis may be useful
for such a risk-informed screening out process
[25, 26].
- The design basis is a kind of criteria for screening
out process. When we determine the design basis
of an event, we have to consider the characteristic
of the event. One of the most important issues in
the Fukushima Dai-Ichi accident was that TEPCO
failed to establish the design basis on the tsunami
height appropriately at the Fukushima Dai-Ichi site.
As explained above, TEPCO only used deterministic
approaches to determine the design basis for tsunami
[16, 17] and they didn’t use the results of the prob-
abilistic tsunami hazard assessment performed in
2006 [18]. However, natural hazards should also
be addressed with a probabilistic approach due to
the nature of natural hazards such as the large
uncertainties regarding the size and the return period.
The deterministic and probabilistic approaches
should complement each other in such a case. 
Reduction of Failure Risk Regions: 
- Next, we need to reduce the failure risk region.
We can reduce the failure risk region by enhancing
the reliability and availability of safety features.
The use of advance material for the safety features
is an example of such efforts. 
- The failure risk region can be reduced further by
expanding the scope of risk assessment and man-
agement. That is, if we identify more failure
scenarios of safety features (risk assessment) and
we do something to reduce the risks due to the
identified failure scenarios (risk management),
we can reduce the residual risk. The extension of
the PSA scopes after the Fukushima Dai-Ichi
accident, e.g. the tsunami PSA, belongs to this
kind of effort. If we addressed broad accident
scenarios, we can find various risk sources of the
residual risk region. The installation of additional
safety systems will be an example of risk manage-
ment, e.g. the EDG vehicle intended to cope with
a long term SBO. 
Mitigation of the Remaining Residual Risks: 
- With the above efforts, we may reduce the residual
risk to a certain level, but we cannot eliminate the
residual risk completely. In other words, there are
some accidents that we cannot prevent. Such residual
risk should be covered not by prevention measures
but by mitigation measures. 
- For a NPP, accident mitigation measures should
have the capability of providing the long term
cooling and essential electricity to nuclear installa-
tions to achieve the ultimate safety goal. In addition,
some features to lower the containment pressure
might be necessary. Activities such as the implemen-
tation of the Extensive Damage Management
Guidance (EDMG) and FLEX (Diverse and Flexible
Coping Strategies) will belong to this category
[27, 28]. 
Prevention and/or Mitigation of the Unknown
Risk:
- The unknown risk region may be reduced as our
knowledge increases in the future. The efforts of
TEPCO to examine the unresolved issues might
be helpful in reducing this type of risk [15]. This
kind of research should be performed continuously.
However, it is difficult to anticipate whether the
reduction of unknown risks based on such researches
will be realized or not. 
- In some cases the existing safety features of NPPs,
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like the safety injection system, may be helpful in
reducing some unknown risks, even though the
design objectives of those safety features is not
coping with this kind of risk.
- However, in general, the only way we can cope
with unknown risks is the same with the approach
to cope with the remaining residual risks. That is,
the existing counter measures to mitigate a severe
accident like FLEX and EDMG might be useful
to reduce the unknown risks as well. Therefore,
we have to make the mitigation measures more
complete considering our ultimate safety goal for
the nuclear installations.
The risk space of Fig.3 and its counter measures are
summarized in Fig.5 based on the above discussions.
The above framework can be helpful in checking the
effectiveness of various post-Fukushima action items.
After the Fukushima Dai-Ichi accidents, a great amount
of efforts are being performed around the world to enhance
nuclear safety. For instance, many countries installed
EDG vehicles and venting systems. However, there are
some arguments about the usefulness and effectiveness
of such activities. The above framework might provide a
more holistic view that enables us to evaluate the combined
effects of various Post-Fukushima activities. 
4. THE ISSUES TO BE IMPROVED IN THE
CURRENT RISK ASSESSMENT AND
MANAGEMENT ASPECTS
As discussed in Section 3, the risk assessment and
management frameworks could play an important role in
improving the design of safety features and the safety
assessments to ensure nuclear safety in the future.
However, the current risk assessment and management
framework should be improved as well. In this section,
we will discuss some of the key issues to be improved that
are related to the current risk assessment and management
framework and/or practices including the PSA.
PSA is a risk assessment tool that has been widely
used in many countries since the 1979 TMI-2 accident to
identify the design and/or operational vulnerabilities of
NPPs. We can also find useful counter measures to
improve safety by using the PSA. PSA integrates the
various aspects such as the deterministic analyses on the
various accident scenarios, reliability of SSC and human
reliability, etc. in order to derive the overall risk profile of
nuclear installations [19]. In the U.S.A., the results of
PSA have also been widely used in risk management
such as the regulatory decision making process [29]. We
previously thought that PSA could predict most of the
significant accident scenarios that could occur in nuclear
installations, i.e. the major strength of PSA is to identify
unanticipated accident scenarios. 
The Fukushima Dai-Ichi accident clearly showed the
strengths and the limitations of PSA. There has been
much discussions about the usefulness of PSA after the
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Fig. 4. Frequency Based Screen Out
Fig. 5. Counter Measures for Each Risk Space
Fukushima Dai-Ichi accident in that PSA didn’t correctly
predict the tsunami risk at the Fukushima Dai-Ichi site.
However, compliance with the PSA was voluntary in
Japan. Most Japanese NPPs focused on the seismic PSA
considering Japanese site conditions. The seismic PSA
was performed for the Fukushima Dai-Ichi NPPs, but the
PSAs of other external events such as floods were not
performed. There was no tsunami PSA as well. 
There are some well-known intrinsic issues regarding
the risk assessment and management such as the complete-
ness and uncertainty, etc. [22]. There are also some emerging
issues in the risk assessment field such as a dynamic PSA
[30], digital I&C PSA [31], etc. However, we will not
cover the intrinsic and emerging issues in this paper even
though some issues of Section 2 are related to these generic
issues. In addition, the risk acceptance and perception issues
will not be covered either in this paper [32].
We will focus only on the revealed issues during the
Fukushima Dai-Ichi accident that should be readdressed
in the traditional Level 1, 2, and 3 PSA framework and
risk management aspects.
Assessment of Tsunami Hazard and/or Risk
The deterministic approach has limitations in handling
the large uncertainties of natural hazards. Rare natural
events such as tsunami should be assessed probabilistically.
Some assessments showed that the anticipated frequency
of huge tsunami on the east coast of Japan is around ~1.0E-4
/year [33]. Considering that a huge tsunami directly resulted
in severe accident at the Fukushima site, this frequency
can be regarded as the core damage frequency of the NPPs.
This frequency is a much higher value than the safety goal
of IAEA for large releases of radioactive materials [34]. 
Considering the site characteristics of the Fukushima
Dai-Ichi NPPs, such tsunami risk should be estimated
before the accident. If tsunami risk is estimated properly,
TEPCO may be more prepared for the tsunami through
appropriate risk management such as raising the height of
the tsunami barrier and/or the change of the EDG location.
Even though the tsunami PSA methodology had not been
established until 2011, the tsunami risk could be estimated
conservatively as in the Reference [35].
Combined Hazard 
Up to now, each natural hazard was treated individually.
The main initiating events of the Fukushima Dai-Ichi
accident were not only the tsunami but also the earthquake.
The earthquake made the accident mitigation more difficult
by delaying the recovery of the off-site power and other
help from off-site.
There was no consideration on the combined effects
of seismic and tsunami events until the Fukushima Dai-
Ichi accident happened. The combined hazard may happen
in various ways such as heavy rain fall combined with a
land slide, etc. We have to consider such combinations in
the risk assessment. For instance, US NRC is trying to
develop a risk assessment framework for seismic induced
fire and/or floods [36]. 
Long Term SBO 
According to NUREG-1150, the major causes of the
core damage in the BWR type like the Fukushima Dai-Ichi
NPPs is a SBO (more that 50%). In addition, the conditional
containment failure probability is about 0.9 [19]. It means
that the possibility of a large radioactive material release
is very high when a LOOP happened in that BWR type.
So the countermeasure for the LOOP is very critical for
that kind of BWR. However, Japanese utilities assumed
that a LOOP could be recovered within a short time with
EDGs and supports from adjacent NPPs. The EDGs lost
their function due to the tsunami since they were located
at a low elevation. In addition, the EDG vehicles did not
work well at the real accident situation. So it seems that
the risk due to the long term SBO was not managed well,
if not ignored, at the Fukushima Dai-Ichi site. The risk
management features for a SBO are to be enhanced.
I&C Systems for Severe Accidents
A severe accident management program was introduced
during the ‘90s in Japan. The program requires the analysis
of the instruments for implementing the Severe Accident
Management Guidelines (SAMG). During the Fukushima
Dai-Ichi accident, the NPPs lost most I&C systems and
some instruments provided erroneous signals to the operators.
As mentioned earlier, the importance of the I&C systems
during a severe accident condition has been emphasized
after the TMI accident [20]. However, the operators did
not have I&C systems that could work during the severe
accident conditions. The failure of the I&C systems should
be modeled in the risk assessment appropriately.
Multi-unit Accident 
- Impact on the Power Recovery 
The long term SBO at the Fukushima Dai-Ichi site was
partly due to the multi-unit accident. This issue is not cov-
ered in current PSA practices. Some papers have examined
solutions to this problem such as component sharing between
units during multi-unit accident [37]. This kind of consid-
eration should be included in the future level 1 PSA. That
is, we need a multi-unit PSA framework like Reference [38].
- Effects on the Accident Management
Before 11 March 2011, it seems that most NPPs in the
world were not prepared for multi-unit accident and the
mass destruction of infrastructure such as the roads nearby
NPPs. The Fukushima Dai-Ichi accident showed that an
accident at a NPP might affect the operation and/or the
accident management of the adjacent NPPs. Up to now, in
most cases, there were few concerns regarding this aspect.
Even though the US NPPs are prepared for the loss of large
area after 911 [27], most countries with many units at a site
were not prepared for this kind of situation. To cope with
such a situation, we may need an accident management strat-
egy at the site level. Such strategies should be risk-informed.
- Effects on the Radiological Consequences
Let us assume that the amount of radioactive material
released from an accident at a NPP is under the threshold
of health hazard. When such an accident occurs twice
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with a time interval, there would be no impact on the
health or environment around the NPPs. However, if such
accidents were to occur from two units at the same time,
the total amount of radioactive material released might
exceed the threshold and impact the health and environment.
This kind of problem was not considered in the current
level 3 PSA. However, to estimate the multi-unit risk, this
kind of issue should be considered in the level 3 PSA
framework. An integrated risk assessment framework
will be helpful in to address this issue [39].
Hydrogen Explosion 
This issue is related to the improper screening out
process and the unknown risk. The hydrogen explosion is
a well-known phenomenon after the TMI-2 accident. The
equipment for preventing hydrogen explosions such as
active re-combiners and/or passive auto-catalytic re-
combiner was introduced into NPPs after the TMI-2 accident.
However, leakage of hydrogen gas and explosions outside
of the containment were not covered in the current level
2 PSA. So the level 2 PSA should be improved to include
this kind of scenario. In addition, the hydrogen explosion
at unit 4 due to the hydrogen generated from unit 3 is a
good example of an unknown risk. We need to revise the
current level 2 PSA with consideration for this kind of
scenarios.
Safety of SFP 
There was a concern about the safety of SFP from the
deterministic point of view [40]. However, there was little
research on the risk assessment of SFP such as the behavior
analysis of SFP under the loss of cooling condition [41].
A complete PSA framework for SFP and other additional
potential sources of the radioactive material release should
be developed to assess the site risk properly. 
Safety of the Damaged NPPs
The Fukushima Dai-Ichi accident is the first accident
with a large radioactive material release from a light water
reactor. There were many phenomena that were not
considered: the integrity of SSC after a beyond design
earthquake, the impact of the contaminated ground and
sea water, etc. We do not have enough knowledge on
how to handle these problems. Even though there are
some efforts related to these topics, we may need more
comprehensive and systematic research on the potential
safety issues related to the safety of damaged NPPs. Based
on such research, we need to include this issue into the
PSA framework. 
Safety and Security Related Issues 
There was an issue related to safety and security. Some
gates of the Fukushima Dai-Ichi NPPs were fail-closed due
to the loss of power. The gates were designed in this way
for the security. Operators had difficulty in mitigating the
accident since they could not access some places quickly
due to the closed gates. We may need to develop a risk
assessment framework that can handle the safety and security
issues consistently. Such problems should also be considered
in the accident management framework.
Human Error and Extremely Harsh Working
Environment
The harsh environment was considered in the existing
severe accident program in general. However, extreme
harsh conditions as in the Fukushima Dai-Ichi case were
not considered in most countries. The future SAMG should
consider this issue.
Risk-informed Emergency Response
The communication systems for emergency response
were broken due to the earthquake at the site. The criteria
for the emergency response equipment were based on the
deterministic criteria. As mentioned before, rare events
should be addressed probabilistically and the related
facilities should be designed considering the result of the
probabilistic risk assessments. In addition, the emergency
plan should be improved by using the level 3 PSA as in
the U.S.A [42]. We may need a risk-informed decision
making supporting system for effective emergency
response.
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Nuclear safety is ensured by the safety features and
confirmed by the safety assessments. The Fukushima Dai-
Ichi accident revealed many problems in the conventional
approaches used to ensure and confirm the safety of nuclear
installations including NPPs. To prevent this kind of
accidents in the future, we have to learn from the accident.
Thereafter, we have to improve the conventional approaches
used to ensure and confirm nuclear safety based on the
lessons learned. 
First of all, we need to understand the intrinsic nature
of the risk posed by the nuclear installations in order to
reduce the risk of the installation systematically. We
suggested the following as a framework for the systematic
risk reduction.
- A more systematic screening out process, e.g. risk-
informed screening process, should be developed in
order to reduce the residual risks caused by the screened
out initiating events. 
- The scope of the risk assessment should be extended
to reduce the residual risk region. 
- The mitigation systems should be prepared for extreme
conditions to cope with not only the residual risks but
also the unknown risks. The counter measures for a
severe accident are to be revised from the deterministic
and probabilistic aspects. 
The risk assessment and management are the essential
elements in ensuring nuclear safety. However, the Fukushima
accident showed some limitations of the current risk
assessment and management framework and/or practices.
The following should be improved and/or developed for
risk assessment. 
- We need a framework to assess the site risk. The
site risk consists of the multi-unit risk and the risks
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from other installations that store radioactive material
such as a SFP. 
- Up to now, most countries have performed only level
1, 2 PSA for full power mode. However, from now
on, we need level 3 PSA including low power shut
down mode in order to understand the overall risks
of the nuclear installations properly.
- The scope of external PSA should be reexamined
considering the site specific hazards. We also need a
risk assessment framework for the combined hazards.
Risk assessment is useful to identify the vulnerabilities
of systems. However, a more important aspect is risk
management. TEPCO already had some information on
the possibility of a huge tsunami. However, it seems that
they failed to manage the tsunami risk properly based on
the given information. So, the risk assessment should lead
to the appropriate risk management. The following should
be improved and/or developed for the risk management.
- The safety features for a severe accident management
should be improved considering the risk perspectives.
- We need a severe accident management framework
at the site level considering the multi-unit accident.
The emergency preparedness should be risk-informed.
A nuclear installation with zero risk is impossible.
However, we can find a way of reducing the risk effectively
and efficiently if we have a more holistic view and under-
stand the nature of the risk as described above. For instance,
we can strengthen DID by using the insights from risk
assessment and management [12] or we can develop a
new risk-informed DID framework [43]. We can determine
the appropriate safety margins or identify the cliff edge
effects based on the sensitivity studies on the risk. 
In conclusion, the risk-informed approach should be
used for enhancing nuclear safety in various aspects.
However, we have to understand the intrinsic nature of
risk as described in this paper to use the risk-informed
approach appropriately.
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